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Conference report - Scoping conference: “Improving the perspective for 
regional trade and investment in West Africa: the key to food security, economic 
development and stability in the region” 
With the scoping study well underway, this conference aimed to grasp the opportunity to: 
1) assess the current state of knowledge as mobilized and identified by the consortium 
partners according to the six deliverables the study seeks to generate; 2) identify 
knowledge gaps, entry points and needs; and 3) catalyze feedback in order to further 
calibrate the design and conduct of the scoping study according to the Ministry’s specific 
knowledge needs regarding its policy approach in West Africa.   
This conference report is the outcome of a half-day conference that was organized in 
support of the scoping study, held on 27 January 2016 at the African Studies Centre 
Leiden, and organized by the African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL), the Agro-Economic 
Research Institute of the Agricultural University of Wageningen (LEI, Wageningen UR) 
and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).  
It follows the conference programme by summarizing the presentations and subsequent 
discussions according to the deliverables of the scoping study, supplemented by the 
syntheses based on the contributions by ECDPM and TradeMark East Africa (TMEA). In 
addition, this report also includes a written input by Prof. Chibuike Uche, senior 
researcher at the African Studies Centre Leiden (See Annex I). His contribution captures 
some of his reflections on the process of regional integration in West Africa, with a 
particular focus on monetary integration.   
Audience 
The conference brought together a broad range of professionals and experts engaged in 
research, policy and interventions targeting West Africa, regional integration & trade and 
food security (See Annex II for the List of Participants).   
Key takeaways  
Worthy of its name, the conference succeeded in providing guidance in terms of more 
carefully determining and narrowing down the scope of the study. More in particular, the 
conference generated the following key takeaways: 
 For Dutch involvement in the process of enhancing regional integration in West 
Africa focus is needed: geographical scope; sectoral focus; thematic approach; 
and a clear local counterpart. 
 The chosen focus should connect to a larger ambition of ECOWAS, and be aware 
of the activities of all relevant governments and donors. 
 But a small donor like the Netherlands should focus on where it has added value. 
 A political economy perspective is needed from the start. Building a sound 
understanding of the relevant (public and private) actors, and their interlinkages, 
helps to provide insight into the ‘winners and losers’ of continuity and change, 
particularly concerning high-risk people and areas, and the most vulnerable 
groups such as women and youth.  
 There is an abundance of (policy) initiatives (projects, programmes, strategies, 
frameworks, funding mechanisms etc.) aimed at regional integration in West 
Africa, many of which have trade as a key entry point, what appears to be the 
most important dimension of integration.   
 Despite an alleged division of labour (by default) between donors and the trend 
towards enhanced donor coordination, donor efforts in West Africa are still to a 
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large extent fragmented and formal donor coordination is largely regarded as 
insufficient.  
 A comprehensive mapping of policy initiatives aimed at regional integration should 
go beyond a sole focus on efforts focusing on trade and by the most engaged 
donors only, as emerging economies (China, India, Brazil etc.) and national 
governments in West Africa themselves become increasingly engaged.  
 The gap between regional agreements, national legislation and actual 
implementation and enforcement on the ground is a major concern. Political 
economy analysis could help to provide insight into the divergence between paper 
and practice.   
 Strategically thinking about promotion of (intra)regional trade inevitably requires 
an emphasis on agricultural/ food products because of their important role in 
(intra)regional trade in West Africa and because of their high potential to serve as 
an entry point for economic transformation in the region. In addition, the 
Netherlands’ expertise fits particularly well here. 
 How strong and well-founded the case for promoting (intra)regional trade in West 
Africa might seem, one should take account of the interests/ incentives in 
maintaining/ pursuing existing or other trade regimes. Furthermore, one should 
not disregard other trade patterns’ potential for sustainable and inclusive 
development in the region, for example with regard to self-sufficiency and food 
security.  
 Informal trade should get major attention because of the high prevalence in West 
Africa, but it asks for further building the knowledge base on informality, also to 
get a more sound understanding of how exactly it can be an entry point for policy 
and for which policy objective(s).  
 Improving data collection is important, and a recognition of the fact that most 
existing data are very unreliable. Building local capacity for data collection is 
critical but requires investments and takes time.  
 TradeMark East Africa can be an inspiration in many ways but one should not 
disregard the significant difference in conditions and circumstances between the 
two regions, which precludes exporting the model to West Africa without careful 
adaptation.  
 The Netherlands could formulate an ambition to be a catalyst for a ‘TradeMark 
West Africa’, but cannot become the major donor. 
 Identification of local partners that can assist or even take the lead in knowledge 
generation and dissemination should possibly include organizations that are 
traditionally not regarded as knowledge institutes, such as private sector 
organizations and financial institutions like (development) banks.  
 The Netherlands should not only formulate Multi-Annual Strategic Plans for the 
Horn and the Great Lakes Area, but also for West Africa as a whole.  
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ABOUT THE CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS 
 
African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL)  
The African Studies Centre Leiden (part of Leiden University) is a knowledge 
institute that undertakes research and is involved in teaching about Africa and it 
aims to promote a better understanding of and insight into historical, current and 
future developments in Africa. It has a major library and information centre on 
Africa. http://www.ascleiden.nl/ See also: http://countryportal.ascleiden.nl. 
 
 
LEI/ Wageningen UR  
The Agro-Economic Research Institute (LEI) of the Agricultural University of 
Wageningen (Wageningen UR) is an independent and internationally leading 
socio-economic research institute that offers governments and companies 
(socio)economic insights and integral advice for sound policies and better 
decision-making in an innovative way http://www.wageningenur.nl/lei 
 
 
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) 
The European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) is a “think 
and do thank” aimed at linking policy and practice in European Development and 
international cooperation and acting as an independent broker between Europe, 
Africa and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) 
http://www.ecdpm.org/ 
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17:45 – 
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INTRODUCTION  
Ton Dietz and Paul Lange 
Increasing concern about instability, population pressure, migration and chronic food 
insecurity in West Africa and growing awareness of the potential of enhanced 
intraregional trade and investment to contribute to sustainable and inclusive economic 
development, has prompted a number of donors including The Netherlands to increase 
their efforts to support West African integration and cooperation. 
The momentum for support has been strengthened by some initial steps towards regional 
integration in West Africa that have been taken since the Malabo Declaration (2013) 
building on increasing political commitment and inspired by progress made in East Africa 
by initiatives such as TradeMark East Africa.   
Support for regional integration and cooperation in West Africa by The Netherlands fits 
within its new Trade, Investment and Development policy and aligns with key Dutch 
policy objectives to promote sustainable and inclusive economic development and to 
enhance food security. Furthermore, there is increased interest of Dutch businesses to 
invest and trade with West Africa and growing recognition of the opportunities following 
from local development challenges in West Africa for Dutch businesses, knowledge 
institutes and civil society to tap into. 
 
Scoping study 
In order for support to regional integration and cooperation in West Africa to be effective 
and calibrated to the specific needs of the region, there is however a need to build a 
more comprehensive understanding of the diverse and complex regional dynamics and to 
gain insight into the opportunities and challenges to regional integration in West Africa.  
By taking stock of existing knowledge, the overall objective of the scoping study is to 
provide a comprehensive picture of The Netherlands’ government ongoing cooperation 
with West Africa and the perspective in terms of policy options for strengthening its 
effectiveness and coherence by giving more emphasis to the promotion of intraregional 
trade and investment.  
More in particular, the scoping study seeks to generate the following deliverables:  
• Inventory of regional policy- and knowledge centers on which the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs can rely on for high quality input and at the same time qualify for 
institutional and other support, aimed at sustaining their potential for high level 
research and policy support in the future. 
• Inventory of literature about trade relations (illegal and legal, agricultural and 
wider) useful for strengthening the knowledge base underpinning the regional 
policy with regard to West Africa, making use of library-, internet- and human 
resources.  
• Inventory of statistics about trade relations (illegal and legal, agricultural and 
wider) useful for strengthening the knowledge base underpinning the regional 
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policy with regard to West Africa, making use of library-, internet- and human 
resources.  
• Inventory of existing Dutch bilateral policies in West Africa in the period 2005-
2015. 
• Inventory of existing policies by regional institutions in West Africa, regional 
policies by other donors and donor coordination efforts in the period 2010-2015.   
• Inventory of policy options and an assessment of their possible effects, building 
on existing work streams and the new policy for aid, trade and entrepreneurship 
for development. 
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Session 1: Inventory of regional policy- and knowledge centers 
 
Paul Lange (ASCL), with comments by Arie Kuyvenhoven (WUR) 
 
In this session the African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL) presented some of its 
preliminary conclusions and observations following from a broad inventory of local 
knowledge institutes in West Africa. The aim is to identify organizations that could serve 
as knowledge partner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to further 
development and implementation of policies aimed at boosting regional integration & 
trade in West Africa.  
 The inventory of knowledge institutes has been initially taken from the supply 
side, in an attempt to come to a sort of broad ‘institutional mapping’ of institutes 
engaged in knowledge generation and dissemination in West Africa. 
 This broad mapping has been based on a number of starting points that will help 
to identify possible knowledge partners, one being the literature list on regional 
trade & investment in West Africa, prepared by the ASCL Library. Looking at the 
knowledge production sources in this literature list, distinguishing between 
knowledge institutes, with universities as a separate category, and development 
community actors, shows that only a small minority of the publications on this list 
comes from West African sources.  
 A second starting point is to look at the local knowledge institutes that have 
contributed to a number of key publications on regional integration & trade in 
West Africa. The two examples that were given are: ‘Regional Integration and 
Cooperation in West Africa. A Multidimensional Perspective’ (1997) by the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and ‘Political Economy of 
Regionalism in West Africa’ (2012) by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI). 
 Another starting point is the Think Tank Initiative (TTI), a programme funded by a 
number of donors, including The Netherlands, aimed at strengthening the capacity 
of independent policy research institutions in the developing world including West 
Africa.  
 The last starting point dealt with the so-called Leiden African Studies Assembly 
(Leiden ASA), an initiative launched by Leiden University in collaboration with 
ASCL. One of the objectives of this initiative is to develop partnerships with a 
number of prominent knowledge institutes on the African continent, including 
some in West Africa.  
 To further determine the suitability of these organizations, the list of local 
knowledge institutes following from these starting points was filtered through desk 
research according to three criteria: 1) policy-relevant research among its core 
activities; 2) geographical focus on West Africa as a whole; and 3) thematic focus 
on (regional) integration as such.  
 Added to this selection were organizations already identified by the Ministry in the 
Terms of Reference of this scoping study, (ENDA/)CACID and Le Hub Rural. The 
residue of local knowledge institutes according to these three criteria represents a 
broad range of types of institutes engaged in knowledge generation and 
dissemination including non-governmental organizations, think tanks and research 
departments of international organizations and financial institutions. The selection 
shows a strong geographical bias with many of them located in Senegal (See Box 
1A).  
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In the round of inputs following the presentation, examples of other criteria indicated by 
the participants to identify knowledge institutes were the methodology applied and its 
capacity in terms of human resources. It was also put forward that rather than selecting 
knowledge partners according to more or less objective criteria such as the ones applied 
in this mapping exercise, it would be perhaps more helpful to build on existing, well-
performing partnerships or to work through reliable individuals working for these 
institutes who have a track record of research performance. Overall, it was generally 
agreed by the participants that a more carefully determined focus of the scoping study 
will help to better identify useful knowledge institutes. Lastly, it was also emphasized 
that when looking for knowledge partners one should not focus solely on organizations 
that are traditionally seen as knowledge institutes (e.g. think tanks, universities) but also 
include other types of organizations that could provide useful input and knowledge such 
as private sector organizations.   
 
 
  African Development Bank (AfDB) (Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire): 
http://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/economics-research/ 
African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP) (Dakar, Senegal):  
http://www.uneca.org/idep  
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) 
(Dakar, Senegal): http://www.codesria.org/ 
Consortium pour la Recherche Économique et Sociale (CRES) (Dakar, Senegal): 
http://www.cres-sn.org/ 
Centre Africain pour le Commerce, l’Integration et le Développement (CACID) 
(Dakar, Senegal): http://www.endacacid.org/ 
Le Hub Rural (Dakar, Senegal): http://www.hubrural.org/ 
Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) (Lagos, Nigeria): http://niianet.org/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1A: List of selected local knowledge institutes and their websites 
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Session 2: Inventory of literature on regional trade & investment 
relations in West Africa 
Ton Dietz (ASCL), with comments by Lia van Wesenbeeck (SOW/VU) 
In this session, the African Studies Centre Leiden (ASCL) shared some preliminary 
observations and conclusions following from an inventory of literature on regional trade & 
investment relations (published between 2000-2015), conducted by the ASCL Library 
with support of the network of Dutch embassies in West Africa.  
 The literature search resulted in a provisional number of 294 relevant titles. The 
allocation over the years demonstrates a major increase in interest for the topic, 
with one fifth of the titles published in 2015-2016 and almost one half in the 
period between 2010-2014.  
 The inventory also indicates a significant geographical/ country bias. The majority 
of the literature addresses West Africa as a whole (35%), or Africa with a strong 
focus on West Africa (14%). In addition, literature on Ghana (13%) and Nigeria 
(11%) account for a considerable share of publications.  
 It further shows that a large majority of the titles has been published in the 
English language (84%), followed at great distance by the French language 
(13%). Even the literature on French-speaking countries in the inventory is 
predominantly published in English.  
 Other noteworthy literature observations include the few commercial book 
publishers compared to the number of publications by universities, the relatively 
large number of publications in journals with great thematic variety, large share of 
authors with African-sounding names and the very limited Dutch input.  
 Based on the literature search, there were 11 ‘pockets of content’ identified, each 
with a number of sub-foci; these can further be grouped in three major domains: 
A. GOVERNANCE, HISTORY AND PRACTICES: 
1) History/ Law: publications focus on the institutional history of ECOWAS, on 
comparing ECOWAS with (the institutional history of) sub-blocks such as UEMOA 
and WAMZ, discuss law enforcement and application; there is some attention for 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA);  
2) Governance: there are conceptual studies on types of ‘regionalisms’ (for 
example the IHK (Industrie- und Handelskammer Mittlerer Niederrhein) 
publication on the level of progress made in terms of the stages of integration) 
(See Figure 2A), that compare legal/ institutional arrangements with actual 
practice indicating a significant implementation gap, that address the widening 
integration agenda since 1993 – good governance, rule of law, food security, 
peace & stability, migration, criminality; there are publications with specific 
attention for the Mano River Union including a recent emphasis on peace 
enforcement along borders and the impact on cross-border trade; there is 
literature that deals with coordination in specific sectors: agriculture, mining, 
power and other infrastructure;   
3) Comparisons: literature focuses on the empirical comparison of ECOWAS with 
other trade blocks – African (SADC, COMESA, EAC) and non-African (EU, 
MERCOSUR) – for example by looking at the rules and regulations, and impact of 
measures of trade volumes and directions. 
 B. ECONOMICS: 
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4) Economics: studies assess the effects of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation 
Scheme (ETLS) on intra-regional trade, including tariffs and non-tariff barriers to 
trade and common external tariff; various studies focus on the impact of 
measures and policies such as EPA (economic partnership agreement with the 
EU), WAPP (power pool), ERERA (regional electricity authority), monetary 
cooperation, customs union, harmonisation migration policies or common 
economic policies; there is some attention for political economy issues and the 
impact of multi-membership;  
5) Monetary issues: there are specific studies on economic and monetary 
cooperation (e.g. UEMOA and WAMZ), the role of central banks, the impact of 
monetary integration on intraregional trade and (how to attract) different kinds of 
financial inflows (investments, development assistance, remittances) and their 
impact;  
6) Migration & Remittances: there is attention for the 1979 Free Movement 
Protocol Dakar ( ‘empty promise’), literature further discusses law & order issues, 
and the developmental/ economic impact of mobility, cross-border movement and 
remittances; there is some gender-specific attention;  
 C. GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIOLOGY:  
7) Reality of Cross-border Relations: publications that deal with different trade 
dimensions (composition, geography), that compare openness and growth, 
different (actual) levels of integration, and intraregional and external trade 
dynamics, that take account of the reality on the ground of trading (facilitation/ 
barriers) and that consider the flaws in data;  
8) Sociology of Cross-border Linkages: literature pays (geographical specific) 
attention to traders (including ‘outsider’ brokers and traders), (shifts in) their 
trade networks, and the impact of their (ethnic/ linguistic) background, women 
traders and their relative importance;  
9) Geography: studies analyze the impact of (transport/ communications/ energy) 
infrastructural development, of urbanization/ population growth on trade, routes, 
markets, indicating gap between actual physical infrastructural arrangements and 
ambitious plans;   
10) Border Studies: literature deals with border zone dynamics and linkages, 
there are analyses on cross-border social networks and traders, discussion of the 
costs of travel and (long-distance) trade, with increasing attention for the role of 
illicit trade, criminal networks and the link with violence and insecurity;  
11) Food Trade & Nutrition Security: studies focus on different dimensions of the 
insecurity/volatility of food trade, that take the perspective of agro-value addition 
and cross-border trade, that discuss specific agricultural products, and seeds and 
fertilizers; there are few empirical long-term studies linking food trade (dynamics) 
and nutrition security.  
In the round of inputs following the presentation, it was pointed out that when 
conducting an inventory of literature on trade one should look beyond the obvious 
keywords to identify key publications that would otherwise (easily) be overlooked. If one 
realizes that  trade is a spatial and social activity, with goods produced somewhere and 
by someone, transported by someone and to markets where they are sold by someone 
and bought by someone, this will raise more interesting issues than an abstract 
approach. Examples of such issues are the role of climate and seasonality, gender 
dimensions of trade, risk (reduction) of transportation of goods, institutional setting of 
markets, and investor relations (emerging economies, historical role of The Netherlands). 
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With regard to the specific contribution by The Netherlands in promoting regional trade, 
it was recommended to (continue to) take an integrated approach (cf. 3D-approach: 
Diplomacy, Defence and Development) aimed at safety and development, and with a 
specific focus on the position of females. It was further suggested to build upon the 
Dutch track record in agricultural value chain management and development, and to seek 
a role in the facilitation of insurance arrangements. In addition to a specific focus on 
women, it was added that the critical role of young people should also be recognized, for 
example with regard to agriculture as the main source for employment. For example, it 
was suggested that calling farmers ‘(agricultural) entrepreneurs’ might help to attract 
young people. With regard to the inventory of literature, the relatively limited number of 
publications linking food trade with food security was seen by the participants as a 
striking conclusion in view of the important role for agricultural/ food products in West 
African regional trade. In order to broaden the inventory, it was suggested to include the 
macro-development and comparative advantage of sectors in ECOWAS countries as 
additional entry points, and to look at more theoretical literature that helps to explain 
reality on the ground. In terms of identifying useful local knowledge production, it was 
mentioned that disclosing publications from these kinds of sources can be challenging as 
they are not always digitally available. As potentially interesting but largely unexplored 
channel, another participant pointed at the abundance of (African) master’s theses and 
PhD dissertations, in addition to other forms of ‘grey literature’.    
 
  
Figure 2A: Levels of regional economic integration (Source: IHK blog; XU, 2015) 
 15 
 
Session 3: Inventory of statistics of regional trade & investment  
     relations in West Africa 
Marie-Luise Rau (LEI/ WUR), with comments by David Ehrhardt (Leiden 
University College) 
 
In this session, the Agro-Economic Research Institute of the Agricultural University of 
Wageningen (LEI, Wageningen UR) gave insight into the different kinds of data indicators 
that could be included in the scoping study in order to broaden the knowledge base, 
some of the challenges related to the sources and availability of statistical data and 
examples of ways to visualize data.   
 In terms of stages of (regional) integration, one could differentiate between so-
called ‘convergence’ indicators and ‘outcome’ indicators. The former look at the 
compliance of member states with agreed policies for integration, while the latter 
assess  the effects of integration when agreements are implemented and 
enforced.  
 Among the range of outcome indicators, there are different types of data, for 
example in terms of way of measurement (direct/ indirect), type of indicator 
(partial/ aggregate) and the level of measurement (economy-wide/ firm-level) 
(See Figure 3A).  
 The UN Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) is universally the main 
classification system for trade of goods. Widely used databases for trade of goods 
data are UNCTAD – Comtrade and OECD-WTO (measuring in value added trade), 
although the latter has no data for African countries. Examples of indicators for 
trade of goods are share of regional trade in GDP and export diversification.  
 The persistent challenge of availability and reliability of data for illicit/ informal 
trade requires finding other ways to disclose (detailed) information on these 
types of trade.  
 (Trade in) Services are increasingly important for African countries, in terms of 
employment and share of GDP (See Figure 3B). Data collection for trade in 
services is often challenging and incomplete, for example because the distinction 
of modes of supplies is usually not made. Examples of such modes generally 
distinguished are cross-border supply and temporary movement of natural 
persons. For trade in services there are a few databases to draw upon such as 
UNCTAD, International Trade Centre (ITC) and the African Development Bank.  
 Non-tariff measures (NTMs) play an important role in international trade because 
they are widely used by national governments to pursue (legitimate) public policy 
objectives. NTMs are referred to as non-tariff barriers when they are used to 
circumvent free trade rules or favor domestic industries. For data on these 
measures, there are a number of databases of references to draw on, such as 
UNCTAD, ITC surveys and complaint registers. The universal NTF classification 
system differentiates between technical and non-technical measures (import-
related measures), and other, export-related measures. Examples include 
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and trade-related investment 
measures.  
 Since the WTO Bali Agreement on Trade Facilitation (2013) there is increasing 
attention and support for easing trade across borders. Examples of indicators 
that measure trade facilitation are fees and charges at customs, and availability 
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and quality of infrastructure. There are a number of databases that collect data 
on these kinds of indicators such as by the OECD (Trade Facilitation Indicators) 
and the World Bank (Doing Business Indicators).  
 There a number of ways to present and visualize data in easy and accessible 
manner, with applications that because of their interactive character particularly 
thrive when used digitally (See Figure 3C and 3D).  
In the round of inputs following the presentation, it was generally agreed that there are 
two gaps when working with and applying statistics. First, there is a gap between what 
the statistics say and what happens in reality. Statistics are of variable quality and data 
collection is often poor, especially if it is done by governments. One participant warned 
that we should be careful with this judgement because there is also reason to believe 
that the data is not so bad as people say. Second, there is a gap between the rules and 
reality, as rules may or may not be implemented. Various participants presented options 
to circumvent these gaps. For example, it was put forward to regard them as ‘noise’. 
Another way forward indicated was to find ways to redress the quality of data, for 
example through critically exploring the sources and possible biases of available 
statistics, focusing more on trends rather than on data points or by looking at other 
sources of data collection and/ or more reliable levels as the sub-national or firm-level 
(as opposed to data collected at the national level which is a dominant mode of data 
collection).  
There were various suggestions put forward by the participants for alternative, more 
reliable data sources and collection methods. For example, it was indicated that transport 
observatories worked very well in East Africa. They did baseline surveys on their own, for 
example on tariff barriers. Committees that were set up in each country then compiled 
lists of tariff barriers based on those statistics so as to eliminate them. The data collected 
by these observatories significantly challenged World Bank statistics that gave a stable 
picture of intraregional trade in East Africa despite huge changes taking place. Another 
method suggested is to approach private sector umbrella bodies that often collect very 
accurate data from their component organizations, or to work through Chambers of 
Commerce. Other useful and reliable data sources indicated are USAID and EUROSTAT. It 
was generally agreed that the way forward is to invest in local data collection, also to 
cross-check already available data sets such as those provided by the World Bank. The 
high costs involved and the considerable time it will take to have any significant impact 
were however highlighted as one of the serious drawbacks.  
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Figure 3B: West Africa – Share of GDP by sector (percentages)  
(source: Beejaye Kokil/ AfDB, 2014) 
Figure 3A: Overview of different outcome indicators (Source: World Bank, 2015) 
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Figure 3C: Example of trade data visualization:  
exports from a selected country (Cote d’Ivoire) to the rest of the world (Source: LEI) 
Figure 3D: Example of trade data visualization: 
EU perspective: exports/ imports from West African trade partners (amount + share%) (Source: LEI) 
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Session 4: ECDPM’s ongoing work on regional integration & trade                
                  in West Africa 
Jeske van Seters and Carmen Torres (ECDPM), with comments by Mayke 
Kaag (ASCL) 
In this session, the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) 
presented some of the key findings of its research on regional integration and trade in 
West Africa, as part of its ongoing work as knowledge partner of the Department of 
Sustainable Economic Development of The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 West Africa is a region that is already home to a large share of Africa’s population 
and is increasingly confronted with fragility, population growth and urbanization.  
 ECOWAS exports: drawing on data provided by UNCTAD – COMTRADE for the 
period 2010-2014, demonstrate that West Africa’s exports depend to a large 
extent on a limited number of raw materials and commodities (petroleum, natural 
gas, rubber, cocoa), with petroleum accounting for more than half of total exports 
(61%). Furthermore, the data further show that agricultural (43%) and food 
products (48%) represent a substantial share of total exports of the region to 
Europe (EU28). Overall largest exported agricultural/ food products in this period 
are cocoa, natural rubber & gums and cotton (See Figure 4A) 
 ECOWAS imports: these data are further used to demonstrate that the share of 
food products (18%) of total imports is higher than of total exports (10%). 
However, the data further show that in the case of food trade with Europe (EU28), 
the share of food imported from Europe (22%) is lower than exported to Europe 
(48&). Overall largest imported agricultural/ food exports in this period are rice, 
wheat and edible products & preparations (See Figure 4B).    
 Trade balance: the UNCTAD data further indicate that the total trade balance for 
the ECOWAS region in 2010-2014 is positive, particularly because of its petroleum 
exports. However, both agricultural and food trade balance are in deficit. With 
regard to the latter, the overall trend for the ECOWAS region in the period 2005-
2015 shows a decreasing trade balance, with only two countries (i.e. Côte d’Ivoire 
and Ghana) in surplus over the years 2010-2014 (See Figure 4C and 4D). For a 
number of key staples (cereals, meat/ poultry) the trend of the last two decades 
indicates to a large extent an ongoing rise of imports (See Figure 4E, 4F and 4G).  
 Intraregional trade: a large share of actual trade flows in West Africa goes 
presumably unreported and is misrecorded. Official data probably only show a 
small portion of total intraregional trade in the region, because a large share is 
informal, estimated at 75% of total intraregional trade. The available official data 
on most traded commodities in the region include only two food products (i.e. 
livestock for exports, and processed food for imports). The most traded food 
products within the region in this period are live animals, edible products & 
preparations and fish, for both exports and imports (See Figure 4H).  
 Main trade routes: little is known about the size and composition of the trade 
flows along the main trade corridors, for example as identified by the Comité 
permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS, 2013) 
(See Figure 4I), or by  Sanaa/ DANIDA in the report in support of its Accelerating 
Trade in West Africa (ATWA) initiative (2015) (See Figure 4J). An exception is the 
study ‘Data Collection Survey on Traffic for International Port and International 
Corridor in Western African’ conducted by JICA (2012) which has collected data on 
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trade flows through traffic flow surveys, for example on type of trade traffic 
(transit versus intraregional) and type of commodity. However, an important 
drawback of this particular study is that it does not include a focus on Nigeria as 
economic powerhouse of the region, which implies that most likely a large share 
of trade in West Africa is missed. Moreover, it is generally assumed that a 
substantial share of (informal) intraregional trade occurs outside of these 
corridors.  
 Trade determinants: there are a number of factors indicated  to explain (informal) 
intraregional trade patterns in the ECOWAS region, including agro-ecological 
determinants, conflict, quality of road transport & communications and exchange 
rate fluctuations.  
 Trade barriers: there are a number of key barriers to trade identified that persist 
in the region, including duties, bans & quotas, road harassment and inadequate 
infrastructure. Through data collected by the so-called l’Observatoire des 
Practiques Anormales (OPA) initiated by UEMOA with assistance of USAID, it 
becomes somewhat clear how these barriers play out for different West African 
countries in terms of controls, bribes and delays per 100 kilometers (See Figure 
4K). Here again, data on the conditions in Nigeria are to a large extent lacking.   
 Regional (sectorial) policies: the Common External Tariff (CET) and the ECOWAS 
Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) are two key regional policies to promote trade 
in the region. These policies reveal that there is a gap between regional 
agreements, national legislation and actual implementation and enforcement on 
the ground. The Regional Agricultural Policy for West Africa (ECOWAP), UEMOA 
Agricultural Policy and the West African Common Industrial Policy (WACIP) are 
examples of regional policies demonstrating that there is poor coordination 
between the different regional sectorial policies.   
 It is concluded that these trade features and conditions require a more strategic 
focus on supporting intraregional trade in West Africa. This should in particular 
include an emphasis on agricultural and food products because of the importance 
of trade in these kinds of products for West Africa and the high ambition and 
potential to strengthen value chains to enhance economic transformation in the 
region. However, at the same time it is indicated that this need strongly contrasts 
with a considerable lack of detailed understanding of actual trade flows in West 
Africa.    
 
In the round of inputs following the presentation, it was generally agreed that the level of 
regional integration in West Africa in terms of actual intraregional trade flows is most 
likely higher than we can account for through official data, because of the large share of 
informal trade for which reliable data is lacking. This prompted another participant to 
question the need to intervene in existing (informal) trade patterns and of promoting 
intraregional trade over other trade patterns by policymakers if these serve their 
purpose. In order to build a more comprehensive understanding of (intraregional) trade 
in West Africa, it was further indicated that in addition to a sole focus on trade patterns, 
there is a need to disclose reliable information on local consumption and production 
patterns and how these are linked to trade flows. In addition, two other 
recommendations that were put forward by the participants to further expand the 
knowledge base on trade flows in West Africa are to look at the comparative 
advantage(s) per country and to assess the impact of seasonality, for example with 
regard to food security and self-sufficiency. It was further underlined that in order to 
understand the prospects of regional food trade versus imports, it is important to look at 
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cultural aspects of food preferences (e.g. preference for broken rice – imported, against 
the regionally produced  whole rice). Finally, on the basis of recent experiences in East 
Africa it was suggested that non-implementation of agreed policies can be countered by 
systematic monitoring and reporting, with an element of naming and shaming.     
  
Figure 4A: ECOWAS exports (percentages, average 2010-2014)  (Source: UNCTAD) 
         Figure 4B: ECOWAS imports (percentages, average 2010-2014) (source: UNCTAD) 
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Figure 4C: ECOWAS food trade balance (in thousands of USD, average 2010-2014) (Source: UNCTAD) 
 Figure 4D: Evolution of ECOWAS food trade balance (in thousands of USD, 2005-2014)  
(Source: UNCTAD) 
 23 
 
 
  
Figure 4E: Evolution of ECOWAS cereal imports (in thousands of USD, 1995-2014)  
(source: UNCTAD) 
Figure 4F: Evolution of ECOWAS meat imports (in thousands of USD, 1995-2014)  
(source: UNCTAD) 
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Figure 4G:  Imports of poultry meat and live poultry in ECOWAS (1988-2012)  
(source: World Bank, 2015) 
Figure 4H: Top 10 intraregional food export and imports in ECOWAS  
(value, average 2010-2014) (Source: UNCTAD) 
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Figure 4J: Main trade corridors in West Africa (source: Sanaa/ DANIDA, 2015) 
Figure 4I: Intraregional trade flows of cattle, cereals, roots and tubers in ECOWAS  
(Source: CILSS, 2013) 
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Figuur 4K: OPA Road Governance (2013) (Source: Sanaa/ DANIDA, 2015) 
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Session 5: Inventory of existing Dutch bilateral policies in West  
                   Africa 
Monique Calon (MFA), with comments by Eric Tollens (KU Leuven) 
In this session, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave account of the more pronounced 
policy focus on West Africa by The Netherlands from the perspective of regional 
integration and trade, and provided insight into some of the Dutch interventions that give 
substance to its engagement in the region.    
 There is increasing international concern about the situation in West Africa, fueled 
by instability, migration, natural disasters, Ebola, population pressure.  
 The opportunities for Dutch companies, knowledge institutes and civil society 
organizations to contribute expertise to respond to local development challenges 
(e.g. upgrading and scaling up of value chains) are expanding. There is increased 
interest on the part of Dutch businesses to invest in and trade with West African 
countries (West Africa is already largest trading partner for the EU within Africa).  
 However there currently is only a limited number of Dutch embassies in the region 
to facilitate these actors to tap into these opportunities. 
 Regional integration and trade have risen to the top of the agenda of the African 
Union and several regional economic communities, which opens up new 
opportunities for Dutch economic diplomacy at the regional level (within trading 
blocs). Nigeria appears to be setting the agenda for regional integration and trade 
in West Africa. However, the scope seems limited from Abidjan to Lagos. 
 The recent Dutch policy note to parliament on inclusion emphasizes the need to 
focus on informal trade and the role of women, and on employment generation. It 
builds on the recognition that trade is very much part of the West African life 
style, and that most of the trade crosses borders and is informal.  
 The international development community including The Netherlands should be 
careful not to obstruct trade flows at the local level, or to impose its agenda on 
Africa. Its focus and interest should be aligned to regional initiatives (ECOWAS)  
aimed at promoting regional trade. 
 There is need for political economy analysis in order to understand the dynamics 
of trade in Africa. It is important to take policy to practice and using practice to 
improve policy. A key question in the context of West Africa is: in what way can 
trade contribute to the stability of the region? 
 Regional trade provides access to a larger market for producers and investors, 
including Dutch companies specialized in processing and distribution. It also leads 
to better alignment of supply and demand, and results in cost reductions. A key 
issue is that urbanization is leading to high demand for agricultural/ food products 
which cannot be met at local or even country level.  
 Although not building on a comprehensive regional policy approach for West Africa 
such as in the case of Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region, there are a 
number of different types of Dutch interventions aimed at regional integration in 
West Africa. For example through support to the organization ENDA/CACID, The 
Netherlands enable civil society and private sector actors to engage in debate and 
implementation of ECOWAS protocols and regulations aimed at promoting regional 
trade. Through its collaboration with ECDPM, it supports capacity building of 
regional economic communities and stakeholder groups (e.g., ECOWAS, Reseau 
des Organisations Paysannes et des Producteurs Agricoles de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, 
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ROPPA) and the regional application of the pan-African Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). In addition, The Netherlands 
commission studies to further underpin regional trade initiatives, such as in the 
agricultural sector (livestock sector, with Wageningen University) or in the case of 
value chains perishables in Benin and Nigeria (with Buck Consultants).  
 Targeted as a (possible) flagship programme in West Africa, The Netherlands is 
together with DANIDA involved in the Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA) 
initiative, aimed at promoting regional integration through expanding trade and 
lowering trade costs along key trade routes in West Africa (See Figure 5A). ATWA 
is aligned with regional (ECOWAS) initiatives to promote regional trade and builds 
on experiences and results in East Africa of TradeMark East Africa (See Section 8). 
It addresses both internal trade issues as well as trade within the region. In order 
to further underpin this initiative, there is a need to conduct diagnostics on the 
main corridors in Ghana, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso with extension to Mali – 
Senegal and Togo, and to undertake borderland studies to get a grip on informal 
trade with a special focus on women traders. 
 There is a strong case for promoting regional trade in West Africa, for example as 
evidence shows that it contributes to poverty alleviation, strengthens local 
economies, enhances food security and increases opportunities for foreign (Dutch) 
investment. It is however key to find the right recipe to ensure that benefits (and 
risks) are shared equitably and that aid and trade are mutually reinforcing.  
 
In the round of inputs following the presentation, it was indicated that when looking 
at donor initiatives including by The Netherlands, one should realize that aid becomes 
increasingly less relevant compared to investment flows and other financial flows. It 
was further stressed that although Dutch businesses are already well represented in 
the region, there is a need to enable more Dutch investors to tap into the 
opportunities in Africa, for example by actively promoting the opportunities in (West) 
Africa, in sectors in which Dutch businesses have comparative advantages. 
Concerning the link with stability, it was however mentioned that it will be a challenge 
to get (Dutch) investors interested to invest in fragile countries such as Mali. In 
response to this concern, the Ebola crisis was presented as an example where this 
crisis was actively seized as an opportunity to combine aid, trade and investment 
initiated through the organization of a trade mission. Regarding the case for 
promoting regional trade and the broad impact on sustainable economic development 
in the region, it was brought forward that one should approach (intra)regional trade 
promotion with an open mind, and not ignore the costs and benefits associated with 
other (existing) trade patterns (local trade, globalization).   
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Figure 5A: ATWA Theory of Change (source: Sanaa/ DANIDA, 2015) 
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Session 6: Inventory of existing policies by regional institutions in                     
                     West Africa, regional policies by other donors and  
                  donor coordination efforts 
Paul Lange (ASCL), with comments by Ruerd Ruben (LEI/WUR) 
 
In this session, ASCL provided some broad outlines of  the wide range of current (policy) 
initiatives aimed at regional integration in West Africa by the international development 
community and regional institutions, by zooming in on efforts that take trade as key 
entry point as one but important dimension of integration.  
 There are two very recent policy mapping examples by 1) the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA) in ‘Evaluation of Swedish Trade-Related 
Support to ECOWAS through Phase II of the Trade Negotiation and Capacity 
Building Project’ (2015); and 2) the Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA) in the ‘Accelerating Trade in West Africa initiative (ATWA) Stage 1 
Report’ (2015). 
 Both mapping examples particularly focus on initiatives that aim to promote and 
facilitate (intra-)regional trade in West Africa. Even when focusing on trade only, 
there is a plurality of initiatives (project, programmes, frameworks, strategies, 
funding mechanisms etc.) (See Figure 6A).  
 Based on these policy mapping examples, the most engaged donors in the area of 
regional integration & trade are: World Bank, African Development Bank, 
European Commission, US/ USAID, Germany/ GIZ, UK/ DfID, The Netherlands, 
Japan/ JICA.   
 Although perhaps surprising that France does not feature as an important bilateral 
donor, it appears that France generally does not engage with ECOWAS on 
development issues (in contrast to peace & security issues) and is mainly involved 
in West African regional integration through the European Union (for example 
through its participation in the European Development Fund). 
 The rise of emerging economies like China, Brazil and India is increasingly felt in 
West Africa but it seems that aid has little relevance in the context of such South-
South cooperation. These countries have interacted predominantly with the region 
in a bilateral, country-to-country way and generally do not feature high in their 
engagement with regional integration initiatives.  
 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and  the Union 
Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA) are regarded as the two main 
regional organizations in West Africa furthering the integration process. As 
possible third key regional organization, for the West African Monetary Institute 
(WAMI) it is apparent that its track record of efforts to establish the West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ) is far less impressive than the achievements of UEMOA.  
 There are a number of other regional/ transnational organizations that drive 
regional integration in West Africa but to a lesser extent. Among them are 
financial institutions such as the Central Bank of West African States (‘La Banque 
Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest’, BCEAO) and the West African 
Development Bank (‘Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement’, BOAD), 
transnational specific purpose organizations like the Permanent Interstates 
Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (‘Comité permanent Inter-Etats de 
Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel’, CILSS) and sub-regional cooperation 
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structures such as the Liptako-Gourma Development Authority (‘Authorité de 
Développement du Liptako-Gourma’, ADLG) (See Box 6B). 
 Although data on donor support to regional integration in West Africa are difficult 
to obtain, the most comprehensive source of information is probably the figures 
on Aid-for-Trade financial flows collected by the OECD. By looking at these figures 
it becomes not only clear that a) the level of resources devoted to trade-related 
support to West Africa have significantly increased in recent years but also b) that 
the European Commission and the larger bilateral European donors are not the 
only major donors engaged in West Africa, which was historically the case.   
 Drawing on the policy mapping effort by DANIDA, there seems to be some sort of 
division of labour (by default) between the donors. At the same time, according to 
the Aid-for-Trade data, it becomes clear that according to most recent figures 
overall the bulk of the money went into either building productive capacity or the 
development of economic infrastructure.   
 It is increasingly visible that the global trend towards more enhanced donor 
coordination and harmonization among bilateral and multilateral donors has also 
bearing on policy initiatives aimed at regional integration and trade in West Africa. 
 Despite the alleged division of labour between and the trend towards enhanced 
donor coordination, it is at the same time generally acknowledged that donor 
efforts in West Africa are still to large extent fragmented and that formal donor 
coordination is largely insufficient, demonstrated by the fact that a) the bulk of 
support aimed at regional integration from a trade perspective is taking place at 
the national level, not the regional level; and b) donors work with different 
preferred partners to support regional integration (cf. donors like France prefer to 
work through UEMOA or Francophone countries, while DfID targets cooperation 
with ECOWAS or with Anglophone countries) 
 To be able to position future Dutch involvement, it is important to frame our 
policy mapping perspective within a comprehensive approach to regional 
integration in West Africa. Three major questions that could help to further frame 
this perspective are: a) How broad:  which other policy areas beyond trade? b) 
How deep: what are the major policy mapping discussion points? c) How multi-
levelled: interventions at which geographical scale(s)? 
 
In the round of inputs following the presentation, it was recommended to look beyond 
donor initiatives as most West African countries are middle income countries now, 
which means that governments in West Africa also spend their own funds to stimulate 
trade and wider integration, and they participate with their own funds in regional 
agencies (like ECOWAS). It was further suggested that policy mapping should go 
beyond a sole focus on trade, and include other policy areas and cross-cutting issues 
as well, for example with regard to attempts to harmonise taxation regimes. In 
response to the allocation of financial resources according to the Aid-for-Trade figures 
(productive capacity building + economic infrastructure), it was that raised that 
probably the ‘software’ of integration (facilitation) is more important than the 
‘hardware’ (physical infrastructure). Improving harbours, roads and markets is 
important, but improving institutions related to cross-border trade and investment is 
more difficult. Transaction costs are often much higher than transport costs as such. 
Monitoring these total costs by innovative ‘crowd monitoring’ – as happens with 
TradeMark East Africa - and making that information public, can be an important 
contribution to circumvent ‘red tape’. Security and insurance issues were added as 
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important areas of attention. It was generally agreed by the participants that a policy 
mapping exercise could not do without adding a political economy lens in order to 
better understand the gap between policy formulation and implementation. An 
exclusive focus on the policy framework is too restrictive. When advising on policies 
for increased integration and improved trade and investment conditions, one has to 
be realistic about what policies can (and will) do. A lot of what actually goes on 
depends on private sector behaviour that circumvents, avoids, or undermines policy, 
and a lot of the integration successes happen despite adverse government behaviour. 
And it is also important to understand why policies so often are not implemented, or 
if implemented do not seem to work in the desired ways. Lastly, regarding the value 
of looking at regional trade & integration from a comparative advantage, it was 
indicated that positions in this debate often come from different political-ideological 
frames, and researchers as well as policy advisors should be aware of these 
contradictory frames. 
 33 
 
  
 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Abuja, Nigeria): 
http://www.ecowas.int/ 
Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA) (Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso): http://www.uemoa.int/ 
West African Monetary Institute (WAMI) (Accra, Ghana): http://www.wami-
imao.org/ 
Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) (Dakar, Senegal):  
www.bceao.int 
Banque Ouest Africaine de Développement (BOAD) (Lomé, Togo): www.boad.org 
Comité permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel 
(CILSS) (Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso): www.cilss.bf 
Authorité de Développement du Liptako-Gourma (ADLG) (Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso): http://liptakogourma.org/ 
 
 
 
 
Box 6B: Key West African organizations engaged in regional integration and their websites 
  Figure 6A: Selection of donor initiatives aimed at regional integration & trade 
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Session 7: Inventory of policy options and possible effects 
Marie-Luise Rau (LEI/WUR), with comments by Marina Diboma and Jan 
Maas (NABC) 
 
In this session, LEI provided some broad guidance on possible parameters and 
frameworks that could help to determine and shape policy options and to assess the 
effects. 
  
 In West Africa, ECOWAS and UEMOA determine trade-related policies, but 
implementation of regional integration agreements is poor and incomplete.  
 International cooperation frameworks such as the West Africa - EU Economic 
Partnership Agreement and the WTO Bali Agreement on trade facilitation affect 
policy options.  
 Existing studies into the effects of regional integration vary in methods applied 
and their scientific soundness, and are difficult to compare because of the fact 
that the results are highly context-specific.    
 When assessing policy options, different effects can be considered, such as trade 
effects, price effects, income effects and employment effects. Other dimensions of 
effects look at the target group (producers, consumers, governments, firms, etc.), 
the level (country, region/local or village level) and specific aspects such as 
gender and the environment.  
 Different kind of reports and studies (e.g. plans/visions for West Africa, country 
reports, development cooperation evaluations) can provide useful insights or 
starting points for policy options.   
 Although perhaps outside the scope of the scoping study, there is the possibility of 
combining qualitative information with a scenario analysis using a quantitative 
approach via a simulation model, such as the Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium 
Tool (MAGNET),  a CGE-model. The general aim of a CGE analysis is to provide 
indications of effects in a consistent, economically sound framework by taking into 
account linkages across all countries as well as all sectors, and to allow the 
inclusion of specific features like nutrition (food security), types of households, 
financial transfers (international aid, remittances) and trade costs.  
 To determine the scope in general and specific policy options in particular, a key 
question would be: in what way can be drawn on priorities/ preferences of the 
Dutch government in order to create synergies and improve policy coherence?    
 
In the round of inputs following the presentation, one participant pointed to the issue of 
sustainability of programme results after programme activities have come to an end, as 
an important dimension of assessing possible effects. It was further indicated that for the 
identification of policy options, for example with regard to obstacles to trade and 
investment, it would be valuable to draw on knowledge and experience of the (Dutch) 
private sector with experience in West Africa, because more and more Dutch businesses 
work with local companies in West Africa. With regard to taking account of these 
experiences, it was however added that multinationals are generally better heard than 
(Dutch) SMEs which somewhat restricts our understanding of the business opportunities 
and challenges. With regard to the use of quantitative models, a participant expressed 
concerns about applying sophisticated models and their results for Dutch policy choices, 
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knowing that reliability of data on trade in West Africa is a major issue. When dealing 
with possible effects, several participants noted the importance of political economy 
analysis to map the key actors, their interests and linkages in order to identify the 
winners and losers of processes of integration.  
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Session 8: Example of TradeMark East Africa 
 
 
In this session, TradeMark East Africa (TMEA) provided insight into their role as catalyst 
of regional integration and intraregional trade in East Africa and shared their experiences 
and lessons learned as possible inspiration and blueprint for West Africa.  
 
 TMEA is a multi-donor “aid for trade” non-profit agency, with presence in Arusha, 
Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Juba, Kampala, Kigali and Nairobi. It has been 
established to support the growth of trade – both regional and international – in 
East Africa.  
 TMEA’s overarching mission is to promote rapid advances in East Africa’s 
integration, trade and global competitiveness for all East Africans. The strategic 
objectives of TMEA are (1) increased physical access; (2) enhanced trade 
environment, and (3) improved business competitiveness (See Figure 8A).  
 The total budget of TMEA over the period 2010-2016 amounts to $560 million, 
making it the largest Aid-for-Trade programme in the world. TMEA funders are 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, The Netherlands, the United States 
and the UK as largest funder providing 60% of the budget. 
 The Netherlands has recently decided to allocate $6 million to TMEA’s Women and 
Trade Programme, from which 25,000 women entrepreneurs and traders across 
East Africa are expected to benefit.  
 TMEA has moved from taking a corridor approach initially needed to get the 
political buy-in to focusing more on the borderlands along those corridors in order 
to become more aligned with poverty alleviation needs (See Figure 8B).   
 The following lessons learned were identified as possible inspiration for West 
Africa: (1) Focus  (continued primary focus on its three strategic objectives); (2) 
Multi-donor backing (to prevent fragmentation of donor efforts); (3) Fast and 
flexible demand-led approach (PDIA, Problem Driven Iterative Approach; donors 
allow TMEA to quickly readjust according to shifts in demands and needs); (4) 
Solid presence on the ground; (5) Regional policy setting combined with national 
implementation; (6) Working through ecosystems with partners and stakeholders 
on the ground; (7) Strongly driven by results/ evidence and value-for-money; (8) 
Carefully balancing between donor interests and local ownership; (9)  Strong 
national and regional ownership; (10) Combination of infrastructure (‘hardware’) 
and trade facilitation (‘software’).  
 
In the round of inputs following the presentation, it was mentioned that TMEA 
significantly benefits from the political buy-in and will to act from the side of the East 
African Community, in sharp contrast to the positioning of the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Another participant exactly called this aspect 
into question in the case of ECOWAS when reminiscing about the feasibility of similar 
initiatives in West Africa. In reaction to this concern, it was mentioned that the ECOWAS 
Commission is in general receptive to TMEA principles, judging from their engagement in 
discussions on the Accelerating Trade in West Africa (ATWA) initiative and that this will 
be further cultivated through showcasing the progress made by TMEA. In an attempt to 
frame the feasibility of initiatives like TMEA in the context of West Africa, it was indicated 
that some preliminary ideas going around build on the starting point of first focusing on a 
subset ECOWAS countries as frontrunners (2 or more) to prepare the ground and to 
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achieve some tangible results (‘quick wins’) before enlarging the geographical scope. 
With regard to the (financial) involvement of the European Commission in TMEA, it was 
made clear that there have been deep negotiations, but that the fact that TMEA is a so-
called company limited by guarantee has proved to be a divisive issue. Concerning the 
engagement by the World Bank, it was further indicated that both organizations each 
firmly cling to their own more or less clearly defined and mutually exclusive mandate in 
the region  
 
 
  
Figuur 8A: TMEA's Theory of Change (source: TMEA) 
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Figure 8B: East Africa Growth corridors (source: TMEA) 
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REFLECTIONS ON THE WAY FORWARD by Ton Dietz and Paul Lange 
(ASCL) (with input from Jeske van Seters – ECDPM - and Marie-
Luise Rau – LEI/WUR) 
1. The search for relevant literature will continue and result in a separate document, 
giving relevant literature about aspects of regional integration in West Africa and 
individual countries in the region published between 2000 and 2016. For the 2010-2016 
period abstracts will be included, if available. On the basis of the completed inventory of 
relevant literature the analysis (now with provisional results in section 1 and 2 of this 
report) will be adjusted and this will become part of the final report, to be ready as a 
draft in mid-March, and as a Final Report a few weeks later. 
2. There will be a more detailed overview of available statistical evidence of trade 
relations in the final report (in section 3), with a specific focus on what is known about 
the dynamics of food and other agricultural trade in the region between 2000 and 2016, 
and its relative importance. There will also be a more detailed overview of policy options, 
as perceived in the literature and in policy documents in particular in section 7 of the 
final report. In section 2 of the final report section we will also summarize the existing 
ideas in the literature and among experts about the impact of regional trade on the 
business climate and on food resilience. The policy options to be discussed in section 7 of 
the final report will make use of these insights, and will also deal with the linkages 
between trade, investment, development and security policies.  
3. Based on evidence so far it is too premature to present solid answers to two of the 
knowledge questions the Ministry wants us to answer. [Which are the expected effects of 
increased regional trade and investment in West Africa on regional development in terms 
of an improved entrepreneurial and investment climate and improved market access for 
SME’s of local producers and traders?" and "Which are the expected positive and counter-
productive effects of increased regional trade and investment in West Africa on the 
resilience of food systems, particularly where chronic or acute food shortages occur 
because of natural disasters or the fragility of states?”. For us it is obvious that these two 
questions deserve a separate follow-up project, and a longer time scale. However, based 
on work done in East Africa (TMEA, and an ongoing ECDPM study) and preliminary work 
for ATWA in West Africa we will formulate hypotheses in the final report, among others 
building on section 6 of the current conference report. Here the scoping conference made 
it abundantly clear that we need a political economy perspective to make sense of the 
‘policy of policy making and the policy of policy implementation’, but in a wider 
framework of understanding the political economy of the main drivers of trade and 
investment, the private sector, with both domestic, and international elements, and often 
intertwined.  
4. Based on impressions gathered from the literature and during the scoping conference 
we would like to share the following reflections on what we see now as the way forward 
for The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On the basis of this report we solicit 
further suggestions and comments (and corrections if needed) from the participants of 
the scoping conference and a few other advisors, which will be included in the final 
report.  
a) It is recommended that the various Netherlands Embassies in the region, and the 
Ministry in The Hague find a way to communicate systematically about the regional trade 
and investment agenda in West Africa. They should not only look at the public sector 
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(and possible support by aid policies), but at 'sustainable diplomacy', linking public and 
private sector concerns, and aid, trade, investments, security, and migration concerns.  
b) It is recommended that The Netherlands formulates as its ambition to be a catalyst for 
multi-donor coordination to support something comparable to TradeMark East Africa for 
West Africa as a whole. It is important that donors share information about their 
approaches (e.g. on corridor development).  
c) However, The Netherlands should not focus its diplomacy and funds too much on 
support for regional agencies like ECOWAS as such. At that level other donors, including 
the EU, should take the lead, and the Netherlands may contribute by selecting specific 
support mechanisms, e.g. the ECOWAS transport observatory. On the other hand it is 
self-evident that the Netherlands should be aware of what is going on at the larger 
ECOWAS (and UEMOA etc.) level, with a particular role for The Netherlands’ Embassy in 
Abuja, see point j.) 
d) A small donor like The Netherlands should not overstretch its abilities to support 
regional integration of trade and investments in West Africa; it should focus on areas and 
domains where The Netherlands has a clear added value, and an acknowledged heritage 
of past performance. 
e) The Netherlands should develop its strategies to support regional integration in West 
Africa by selecting one strong African partner in the region as lead partner. With the 
existing information so far, to us it seems that the African Development Bank with its 
headquarters in Abidjan is that lead partner. This does not preclude the involvement of 
other local knowledge partners, but suggests a clear hierarchy in the supported 
knowledge network. In the next few weeks we need to know more about the AfDB, and 
potential other ´lead agents´.   
f). It is recommended that The Netherlands focusses its own aid and trade support to 
West Africa's regionalization agenda on trade in (imported and regionally produced) food 
products, with a focus on North-South and South-North linkages between Ivory Coast, 
Ghana and Burkina Faso, and with special attention for the food provisioning of 
Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso as the major inland cities in that sub-region. In 
addition the trade in animals and livestock products (mainly North-South) to the major 
cities in Ghana and Ivory Coast deserves attention, as well as cross-border food linkages 
between Ghana and Ivory Coast, including trade in fish. The Netherlands should support 
value addition and quality enhancement of food products in the region (agro-food 
industrialization). For us the choice of this sub-region acknowledges the growing 
importance of Ivory Coast; and makes proper use of the new Netherlands’ Embassy 
there. It crosses the English-French divide and the South-North divide and it corrects the 
mistake of closing the Netherlands Embassy in Burkina Faso. It can make use of an 
extensive network of Dutch expertise in the private sector and in knowledge agencies, 
and their (former) partners in the region. For the time being it is not wise to concentrate 
on the Senegal/Guinea-Mali corridors and on the complicated eastern part of the West 
African Region. The Netherlands can build on the preliminary work done for ATWA.   
g) Attention for trade routes and transport and other trade barriers along those routes 
(including the major harbours, and border posts) should include formal and informal 
transactions and value chains. Here a sound analysis of major actors, and the political 
economy of those actors (also in historical perspective) is a prerequisite for 
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understanding opportunities and threats, risks and chances. Both for local/regional 
entrepreneurs and for foreign (including Dutch) business. Attention for informal food 
trade and its linkages to food security in the region asks for a focus on women producers 
and traders, and The Netherlands should go beyond corridor development and formal 
trade (with mainly men involved).  
h) It may be useful to combine a Dutch focus on the Burkina Faso/Ghana/Ivory Coast 
trade region with some comparative attention for the Mali-Senegal border zone and the 
Ghana/Togo/Benin/Burkina Faso/Niger border zone. 
i) The food dynamics in Burkina Faso's border region with Ghana and Ivory Coast deserve 
special attention, with attention for seasonality, and long-term trends (a solid baseline 
survey is recommended and support to the AfDB in building up and using a proper data 
monitoring system).  
j) It is recommended that the new Embassy of The Netherlands in Ivory Coast gets the 
mandate to develop a regional policy of sustainable diplomacy for the three countries, 
and to include Burkina Faso in the Embassy's activities related to trade, investment and 
aid. Of course this should be done in close collaboration with the Netherlands Embassy in 
Accra, and also with The Netherlands Embassy in Abuja, with regard to connections with 
the overall ECOWAS approach (with headquarters in Abuja). It is also recommended that 
there will be regular meetings about regional trade, aid and investment between the 
relevant The Netherlands’ Embassies in the region (see earlier, point 4a).  
k) It is recommended that The Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the relevant 
Embassies in the region not only involve local policymakers and knowledge centres (and 
supporting institutions in the Netherlands), but also representatives of the private sector 
in the region (and a support agency like the Netherlands African Business Council, linking 
Dutch and local entrepreneurs). It is also recommended to connect to Dutch agencies 
with a long presence in the area, and with relevant expertise and networks, like SNV and 
Agriprofocus.  
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ANNEX I REFLECTIONS BY PROF. CHIBUIKE UCHE  
Regional Integration in West Africa, with a focus on monetary integration  
Chibuike Uche is senior researcher at the African Studies Centre Leiden, and specialized 
in the governance of finance and integrity in (West) Africa. He is also advisor to the 
Central Bank of Nigeria, and former Professor of Banking and Financial Institutions at the 
University of Nigeria. He did his PhD at the London School of Economics.  
 
 
Map of West Africa (source: www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/west-africa-map) 
 
Summary 
I know so little about Dutch policies in West Africa especially with respect to promoting 
intraregional trade and investments. My comments will therefore tend to be more 
general. I will simply document what I consider to be the main problems with 
intraregional trade and integration in the sub-region. Despite these problems, my view is 
that there is still room for facilitating such investments and trade. Most of the changes 
will however have to come from within the subcontinent. Despite many missed 
opportunities and false starts, internal market dynamics have started encouraging more 
intraregional trade and investments in the sub region. My advice therefore will be for 
foreign donors to restrict their support to the arena of providing regional infrastructural 
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support rather than providing country level support. This will save such bodies the 
complexity of having to deal with a complex sub-continent at a micro level.   
 
Problems with Intraregional Trade and Investment in West Africa 
A major problem with regional integration in West Africa is currency convertibility. With 
several currencies in use in this region, which consist of some of the poorest countries in 
the world, the transaction costs of such regional trade is normally very high. The history 
of this has been well documented elsewhere (Uche, 2001). More recently however I have 
come to the careful conclusion that the Nigerian Naira lost its opportunity of becoming 
the regional currency of choice (that it was considered as such is not surprising given the 
country’s population and size of its economy) in 1984 when its Government unilaterally 
changed the colour of Naira and gave only a two weeks exchange window, with strict 
guidelines, for this to happen. This essentially demonetized all the Naira ‘reserves’ held in 
other West African countries. Unfortunately, the currency is yet to recover from this. 
Despite the fact that Nigeria represents about half of the sub-region’s economy, the 
Naira is still mainly exchanged informally in the sub-region. The subsequent dual track 
ECOWAS policy towards a single currency for the region has, I dare say, failed. 
Despite the above failure, intra-regional investments in West Africa are actually on the 
increase with the Nigerian banking sector leading the way. This development was mainly 
because of the 2005 banking consolidation exercise in Nigeria which essentially required 
these banks to increase their paid up capital by over 1000 percent within a very short 
period. The banks that survived had so much capital and thus began to look abroad for 
its investments. Nigerian banks, for instance have investments in almost all West African 
countries. I have however argued elsewhere that most of these banks are operating 
more like local banks rather than international banks (Uche, 2015). Despite this, it is 
important to note that the expansion of Nigerian banks across the subcontinent has 
essentially improved competition in their host economies. This is definitely a good omen 
for regional integration. 
Another important point of interest is the fact that infrastructural decay, high cost of 
operations and corruption in Nigeria has in recent times been encouraging multinational 
businesses to relocate to other West African countries with better infrastructure. More 
recently, complex and difficult foreign exchange regulation in Nigeria is forcing several 
multinationals to rethink their operational strategy in the country. With the ECOWAS Free 
Trade Agreement, such businesses remain able to service their customers in Nigeria. 
Western intervention in region-wide infrastructure like road and rail networks will further 
assist this process of allowing multinational businesses to settle where they are most 
comfortable in the Continent. With the current low oil prices and its attendant impact on 
Nigerian oil rents, the political survival of any Nigerian Government will depend on its 
ability to make its territory more welcoming to foreign businesses.   
The pessimistic observers may of course argue that the Nigerian Government may react 
with restrictive measures like reneging on the ECOWAS free-trade agreements. While this 
may have been possible two decades ago, it is unlikely to happen now. There are clearly 
more Nigerian businesses and citizens in other West African countries than the reverse. 
Nigeria is therefore no longer in a position to flex its political muscle in the above 
direction. The only viable alternative left for the country is to improve its governance 
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standards. The declining crude oil price will at the very least serve as a reality check for 
the country.  
Interestingly, it is not only Nigerians and Nigerian businesses that are spreading abroad. 
Nigerian culture is also spreading. This is helping to bring down the social, cultural and 
colonial barriers that have long dogged the continent. Increasingly, for instance, Nigerian 
films and music are becoming popular across the sub region including even in the 
francophone countries. This in my view is very significant. Anybody who has travelled 
across the subcontinent by road will appreciate the stark difference in the experience of 
crossing from Anglophone to Francophone countries.  
Interestingly, most Anglophone countries in West Africa are encircled by Francophone 
countries. This colonial divide has been a major impediment to intraregional trade. One 
way Europe as a whole can help to mitigate this problem is to allow for the expansion of 
the Francophone monetary Union to include all the excluded countries in West Africa, 
with the exception of Nigeria. This will essentially create two major trading blocks in the 
subcontinent thus making regional trade more competitive (Uche, 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
 Europe should keep regional integration support to West Africa at the macro level 
by supporting only regional infrastructural developments.  
 
 Europe should allow for the expansion of the Francophone monetary zone to 
include all the excluded West African countries, with the exception of Nigeria.  
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